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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 allows a person who is dissatisfied by a
decision of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review
by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act."
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative hearings. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the
final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Board act within its jurisdiction and authority in determining that
TECS was required to participate in the Utah Retirement System between
August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004?

2.

Did the Board correctly determine that Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002)
required TECS to participate with URS between August 1, 2002 and July 1,
2004?

3.

Did the Hearing Officer correctly determine that HB 108(2004) did not
merely clarify the law, but changed the law by making participation by
charter schools with Utah Retirement System voluntary rather than
mandatory?

1

4.

Is URS unjustly enriched by requiring TECS to comply with the law?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues before this Court involve the Board's interpretation and
application of statutes regarding Petitioner, Thomas Edison Charter School's
("TECS") participation in the Utah Retirement System ("URS") between August
1, 2002 and July 1, 2004. The Utah Supreme Court has found that when the Board
has not been granted discretion to interpret and apply a statute by the legislature,
"[the court] review[s] the Board's application or interpretation of a statute as a
question of law under the correction-of-error standard." Sindt v. Retirement
5oart/,2007UTl61|5.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §49-ll-102(18)(2002).
(a)"Employer" means any department, educational institution, or political
subdivision of the state eligible to participate in a government-sponsored
retirement system under federal law.
(b)"Employer" may also include an agency financed in whole or in part by
public funds as allowed under Chapter 12 or 13.

Utah Code Ann. §49-ll-102(17)(2002).
"Educational institution" means a political subdivision or instrumentality of
the state or a combination thereof primarily engaged in educational
activities or the administration or servicing of educational activities,
including:
(a)
the State Board of Education and its
instrumentalities;
(b)
any institution of higher education and its
branches;
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(c)
(d)
(e)

any school district and its instrumentalities;
any vocational and technical school; and
any entity arising out of a consolidation
agreement between entities described under this
Subsection (17).

Utah Code Ann. §49-13-201(2002). System membership-Eligibility.
(1) Beginning July 1, 1986, the state and its educational institutions shall
participate in this system.
(a) A person entering regular full-time employment with the state or its
educational institutions after July 1, 1986, is eligible for service credit m
this system.
(b) A regular full-time employee of the state or its educational
institutions prior to July 1, 1986, may either become eligible for service
credit in this system or remain eligible for service in this system
established under Chapter 12, Public Employees' Contributory
Retirement Act, by following the procedures established by the board in
accordance with this chapter.
(2) An employer, other than the state and its educational institutions, may
participate in this system except that once an employer elects to participate in this
system, that election is irrevocable.
(a) A person entering regular full-time employment with a participating
employer which elects to participate in this system is eligible for service
credit in this system.
(b) A person in regular full-time employment with a participating
employer prior to the participating employer's election to participate in
this system may either become eligible for service credit in this system
or remain eligible for service in this system established under Chapter
12, Public Employees' Contributory Retirement Act, by following the
procedures established by the board in accordance with this chapter.

Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002). Participation of employers-LimitationsExclusions-Admission requirements-Nondiscrimination requirements.
(l)(a) Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an employer is a
participating employer and may not withdraw from participation in this
system.
(b) In addition to their participation in this system, participating
employers may provide or participate in any additional public or private
retirement, supplemental or defined contribution plan, either directly or
indirectly, for their employees.
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(2) An employer not initially admitted or included as a participating
employer in this system prior to January 1, 1982, may be excluded from
participation in this system if the employer elects not to provide or
participate in any type of private or public retirement, supplemental or
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for its employee,
except for Social Security.
(3) If an employer elects at any time to provide or participate in any type of
public or private retirement, supplemental or defined contribution plan,
either directly or indirectly, except for social security, the employer shall
be a participating employer in this system.
(4)(a) Any employer may by resolution of its governing body apply for
admission to this system.
(b) Upon approval of the board, the employer is a
participating employer in this system and is subject to this
title.
(5) If a participating employer purchases service credit on behalf of regular
full-time employees for service rendered prior to the participating
employer's admission to this system, the service credit shall be purchased
in a nondiscriminatory manner on behalf of all current and former regular
full-time employees who were eligible for service credit at the time
service was rendered.
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2004). Participation of employers-LimitationsExclusions-Admission requirements-Nondiscrimination requirements.
(l)(a) Unless excluded under Subsection (2) or (3), an employer is a
participating employer and may not withdraw from participation in this
system.
(b) In addition to their participation in this system, participating
employers may provide or participate in any additional public or private
retirement, supplemental or defined contribution plan, either directly or
indirectly, for their employees.
(2) An employer not initially admitted or included as a participating
employer in this system prior to January 1, 1982, may be excluded from
participation in this system if:
(a) the employer elects not to provide or participate in any type of private
or public retirement, supplemental or defined contribution plan, either
directly or indirectly, for its employees, except for Social Security; or
(b) the employer offers another collectively bargained retirement benefit
and has continued to do so on an uninterrupted basis since that date.
(3) An employer that is a charter school sponsored by the State Board of
Education or a local school district that makes an election of
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nonparticipation in accordance with Section 53A-la-512 shall be
excluded as a participating employer.
(4) If an employer, except an employer that maintains a collectively
bargained plan under Subsection (2)(b), elects at any time to provide or
participate in any type of public or private retirement, supplemental or
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, except for Social
Security, the employer shall be a participating employer in this system.
(5)(a) Any employer may by resolution of its governing body apply for
admission to this system.
(b) Upon approval of the board, the employer is a participating employer
in this system and is subject to this title.
(6) If a participating employer purchases service credit on behalf of regular
full-time employees for service rendered prior to the participating
employer's admission to this system, the service credit shall be purchased
in a nondiscriminatory manner on behalf of all current and former regular
full-time employees who were eligible for service credit at the time
service was rendered.
Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002). Employees of charter schools.
(1) A charter school shall select its own employees.
(2) The school's governing body shall determine the level of compensation
and all terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided
in this part.
(3)(a) To accommodate differentiated staffing and better meet students
needs, a charter school, under rules adopted by the State Board of
Education, shall employ teachers who:
(i) are licensed; or
(ii) on the basis of demonstrated competency, would qualify to teach
under alternative certification or authorization programs.
(b) The school's governing body shall disclose the qualifications of
its teachers to the parents of its students.
(4)(a) An employee of a school district may request a leave of absence in
order to work in a charter school upon approval of the local school board,
(b) While on leave, the employee may retain seniority accrued in the
school district and may continue to be covered by the benefit program
of the district if the charter school and the locally elected school board
mutually agree.
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Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2004). Employees of charter schools.
(1) A charter school shall select its own employees.
(2) The school's governing body shall determine the level of compensation
and all terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided
in Subsections (6) and (7) and under this part.
(3) The following statutes governing public employees and officers do not
apply to charter schools:
(a) Chapter 8, Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act;
(b) Chapter 10, Educator Evaluation; and
(c) Title 52, Chapter 3, Prohibiting Employment of Relatives.
(4)(a) To accommodate differentiated staffing and better meet students
needs, a charter school, under rules adopted by the State Board of
Education, shall employ teachers who:
(i) are licenced; or
(ii) on the basis of demonstrated competency, would qualify to teach under
alternative certification or authorization programs.
(b) The school's governing body shall disclose the qualifications of its
teachers to the parents of its students.
(5)(a) An employee of a school district may request a leave of absence in
order to work in a charter school upon approval of the local school board.
(b) While on leave, the employee may retain seniority accrued in the school
district and may continue to be covered by the benefit program of the
district if the charter school and the locally elected school board mutually
agree.
(6) Except as provided under Subsection (7), an employee of a charter
school shall be a member of a retirement system under Title 49, Utah State
Retirement and Insurance Act.
(7)(a) At the time of application for a charter school, whether sponsored by
the state or a school district, a proposed charter school may make an
election of nonparticipation as an employer for retirement programs under
Title 49, Chapter 12, Public Employees' Contributory Retirement Act and
under Title 49, Chapter 13, Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement
Act.
(b) A charter school that was approved prior to July 1, 2004 may make an
election of nonparticipation prior to December 31, 2004.
(c) An election provided under this Subsection (7):
(i) is a one-time election made at the time specified under Subsection
(7)(a) or (b);
(ii) shall be documented by a resolution adopted by the governing
body of the charter school;
(iii) is irrevocable; and
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(iv) applies to the charter school as the employer and to all
employees of the charter school.
(d) The governing body of a charter school may offer employee benefit
plans for its employees:
(i) under Title 49, Chapter 20, Public Employees' Benefit and
Insurance Program Act; or
(ii) under any other program.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
TECS filed its Request for Board Action on December 22, 2004, requesting
permission to withdraw from participation with URS retroactive to 2002. See,
Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 5-15.1
On October 3, 2006, a hearing was held before the Administrative Hearing
Officer (hereinafter "AHO"), Richard C. Howe, on TECS' Request for Board
Action. See, HR at 55. TECS was represented by Marty E. Moore of the law firm
of Bearnson and Peck, LLC. The Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") was
represented by David B. Hansen of the law firm of Howard, Phillips & Andersen.
See, HR at 175. On November 28, 2006, the AHO issued his Ruling denying
TECS' request and directed counsel for the Board to draft Findings of Facts, and
Conclusions of Law and Order. See, HR at 113-115. The AHO signed the

1

Originally, TECS filed a Complaint with the First Judicial District Court of
Cache County, seeking a declaratory judgment to determine its legal rights with
regards to the Board on August 20, 2004. The Board filed a Motion to Dismiss
based on TECS' failure to exhaust its administrative remedies on October 15,
2004. Judge Clint S. Judkins of the First Judicial District Court of Cache County
granted the Board's Motion to Dismiss due to TECS' failure to exhaust
administrative remedies on December 1, 2004. TECS did not appeal the decision
made by Judge Judkins.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on November 28,2006. See,
HR at 181. The Board adopted the Final Order on December 14, 2006. See,
Addendum A; See also HR at 182.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") is a statutorily created entity
under Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-202, which administers the Utah
Retirement System's ("URS") plans and programs for all public
employers which are eligible under Title 49. Addendum A; See also,
HRatl75.

2.

Thomas Edison Charter School ("TECS") is a state-sponsored charter
school that receives public funds and is engaged in educational
activities. Id.

3.

Before receiving its charter and opening the school to students in the fall
of 2002, the TECS Governing Board considered offering retirement
benefits to TECS employees at a meeting held on March 6, 2002. Id.

4.

The TECS Governing Board voted at a meeting on December 4, 2002,
and January 16, 2003, to set up a 40IK retirement plan for its
employees. Id.

5.

TECS was advised by representatives of the Utah State Office of
Education (the "USOE"), which was TECS's statutory sponsor at the
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time - that charter schools offering retirement benefits to their
employees were legally required to participate in the URS. Id.
The USOE position regarding mandatory participation in the URS was
circulated to charter schools in a June 24, 2003, e-mail from Patty
Murphy, Education Specialist in Finance and Auditing at the USOE,
stating:
The question of whether a charter needs to participate in the
State's retirement system has been raised by a new charter
school. For purposes of clarification, as a state educational
entity, if any retirement is offered to employees, participation
in the State's system is mandatory. Therefore, if no
retirement plan is offered, participation is not mandatory.
The penalty of recovery is expensive. For example, if a
charter school has offered a 403b fro three years, the school
must contribute all funds (including interest) that would have
accrued during that time to the State's system. Please see
Utah Code 49-13-201 to 203. For further information, please
contact Cindy Bon at State Retirement Office, 801-366-7736.
The statement in Ms. Murphy's e-mail set forth in the paragraph
above regarding mandatory participation in the URS accurately
reflected the URS's position on this subject through 2003 and at
all times prior thereto and since. Id.
In the summer of 2003, the TECS Governing Board met in Cache
County with Cory Wood, the URS field services representative in Cache
County - who stated that TECS was legally required to join URS if the
TECS Governing Board offered any retirement benefits to TECS
employees. Id.
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8.

At its meeting on September 9, 2003, the TECS Governing Board voted
to join URS, giving as its reason in its minutes the USOE decree that
TECS "cannot opt out of the URS." TECS joined URS rather than
establish a privately administered pension plan because of direction
from the URS and the Utah State Office of Education which was then
TECS's charter sponsor. Id.

9.

On November 5, 2003, TECS voluntarily filed an Employer Application
for the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System with an
effective date of August 2002. TECS included with its application a
letter of intention dated November 5, 2003, signed by the TECS Board
Chairman, asking for retroactive benefits for its employees back to the
beginning of the 2002-2003 school year. Id.

10.

On December 11, 2003, TECS was approved by the URSB for
membership in the URS. Id.

11.

Normal contribution reporting for TECS employees began in January
2004 and continued into the first part of March 2004. Total retirement
contributions received by URS during this period were $11,733.97. Id.

12.

TECS has made no contributions to the URS since it paid $11,797.37 in
the first part of 2004. Id.

13.

In its 2004 general session, the Utah Legislature enacted H.B. 108,
which was signed into law by Gov. Walker on March 23, 2004. Id.
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14.

In September 2004, the TECS Governing Board voted to opt out of the
URS under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-13-202 and 53Ala-512 as amended by H.B. 108 in the 2004 general legislative session.
TECS's Declaration of Participation or Intent for a Charter School
stating that TECS had made "an irrevocable election of nonparticipation
as an employer for retirement programs with Utah Retirement Systems
under Title 49" effective July 1, 2004, was submitted to the URS in
December 2004. Id.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613, the Board maintains subject matter
jurisdiction to determine all legal rights arising out of Title 49. One of those rights
and obligations is the requirement of public employers to participate with URS
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002). Even though TECS argued that it
need not comply with Title 49 due to an alleged conflicting statute in Utah Code
Ann. §53A-la-512 (2002), the Board maintained the subject matter jurisdiction to
decide whether the two statutes were in conflict, and whether Title 49 should take
precedence over Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 (2002).
On the merits, the Board correctly determined that under Utan v^oae Ann.
§49-13-202 (2002), TECS was required to participate with URS for its employees
between August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004. TECS' argument that Utah Code Ann.
§53A-la-512 (2002) created an irreconcilable conflict with Utah Code Ann. §49-
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13-202 (2002) is incorrect because: 1) Any perceived conflict between these
statutes can be harmonized; and 2) the rules of statutory construction favor Utah
Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002) over Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 (2002) because
it was enacted later in time and is more specific. Each of these reasons is
discussed below.
First, the Board correctly determined that Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202
(2002) and Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 (2002) can be harmonized. Utah Code
Ann. §49-13-202 (2002) required public employers to participate with URS if it
offered any retirement benefits for its employees. If a public employer offered no
retirement benefits, it need not participate with URS. Utah Code Ann. §53A-la512 (2002) allowed a charter school to determine the level of compensation and
the terms and conditions for its employees. Thus, in harmonizing these two
provisions, TECS could determine whether it wanted to provide retirement
benefits to its employees as a term or condition of employment, but once it did so,
it was required to participate with URS.
Second, in the alternative, even if an irreconcilable conflict is found
between the statutes, common law statutory construction rules dictate that Utah
Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002) should take precedence over Utah Code Ann.
§53A-la-512 (2002) because it was enacted later in time and is more specific.
The relevant provisions of Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 (2002) were enacted by
the legislature in 1998, while Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002) was enacted in
2002. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002) sets forth the eligibility
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requirements for public employers to participate with URS for a specific employee
retirement benefit. Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 (2002) only grants the general
authority to charter schools to determine the terms and conditions of their
employees' employment. Hence, in the event of an irreconcilable conflict, Utah
Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002) should take precedence over Utah Code Ann.
§53A-la-512 (2002) because it was both enacted later in time and was more
specific.
In its Order, the Board also correctly determined that HB 108 (2004)
amended the law and thus could not be applied retroactively. Contrarily, TECS
argues that HB 108 (2004) was merely a clarification of the legislature's intent in
enacting Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 (1998) and thus TECS need not meet the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202 (2002). Utah Courts have allowed
legislative enactments to be applied retroactively when they are either solely
remedial or procedural. HB 108 (2004) was neither. This bill allowed charter
schools only a small window from July 1, 2004, until December 31,2004, in
which to make an irrevocable election of nonparticipation with URS. Thus, HB
108 (2004) cannot be applied retroactively because it made substantive changes to
the existing law.
Finally, as a policy matter URS is required to protect the employees of
public employers who determine inappropriately not to contribute to their
employees' retirement. TECS' allegations of unjust enrichment by URS fail
because URS is a public entity with no profit motive, and this issue was never
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raised before the Board. URS did nothing more than attempt to protect employees
and enforce Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202 requiring TECS to participate with URS
between August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY IN
DETERMINING THAT T E C S WAS REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS BETWEEN AUGUST 1, 2002 AND JULY 1,

2004.
The Board had subject matter jurisdiction to determine that TECS was
required to participate in the URS prior to July 1, 2004. The Utah Supreme Court
has held that a body has subject matter jurisdiction " . . . if the case is one of the
type of cases the court has been empowered to entertain by the constitution or
statute from which the court derives its authority." Myers v. State of Utah, 94 P.3d
211,215 (Utah 2004) (citing In re Estate of McLaughlin, 754 P.2d 679, 681-82
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments §11 (1982)).
Here, the Board is a statutorily created entity under Utah Code Ann. Title
49, Chapter 11. Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613 sets forth the jurisidictional scope
and procedure for administrative appeals of the Board. Utah Code Ann. §49-11613(2003) states in part,
(l)(a) All members, retirees, participants, alternative payees, or
covered individuals of a system, plan, or program under this title
shall acquaint themselves with their rights and obligations under this
title.
(b) A person who claims a benefit, legal right, or employment right
under this title shall request a ruling by the executive director.
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(c) A person who is dissatisfied by a ruling of the executive director
with respect to any benefit claim or legal right under any system,
plan, or program under this title shall request a review of that
claim by a hearing officer.
(7) A party aggrieved by the board's decision may obtain judicial
review by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.

This Court has interpreted this section that "any party asserting a legal right
against [a system administered by the Board] 'may seek judicial review only after
exhausting administrative remedies available.'" Gunn v. Utah State Retirement
Bd.9 155 P.3d 113, 2007 UT App 4,(cert. denied) 2007 UT-, -P.3d.~.
Here, TECS' request for Board Action clearly involved a "legal right...
under [Title 49]." Specifically, TECS questioned its legal right not to be required
to participate in URS under Utah Code Ann. §49-11-202 between August, 2002 to
July, 2004 and thus not pay the required retirement contributions on behalf of its
employees to URS. As discussed infra, the only way for TECS to be excluded
from this "legal right" under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002)2 was to not offer
any other type of employee retirement plan. Because there was a "legal right" at
issue, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613 jurisdiction was with the Board.
2

Throughout this Brief, the Board refers to the relevant statutes as the 2002
statutes. The Board believes this is correct because the law at the time the
employer wanted to begin offering retirement benefits to its employees would
apply. Thus, when TECS voted to join URS in 2003, retroactive to August 1,
2002, the eligibility rules for 2002 should apply.
Nevertheless, the Board notes that no changes were made to the relevant
statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§49-13-202 or 53A-la-512) by the legislature in 2003.
Thus, whether it is the 2002 or 2003 laws that apply is immaterial because these
statutes were the same during both years.
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Instead, presumably TECS wishes this Court to declare that the District
Court instead of the Board has subject matter jurisdiction over legal rights under
Title 49. However, according to Utah Code Ann. §49-11-613 and the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, an entity claiming rights or benefits from an
administrative agency must first exhaust its administrative remedies prior to
seeking judicial review with the courts. Utah Courts have previously held that the
failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprived the Board of the opportunity to
hear, analyze, and critically review a matter within the purview of its particular
responsibility and expertise. See, Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621
P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980).3
Further, Utah courts have implicitly recognized that in order for an
administrative agency to fulfill its statutory obligations, it may interpret general
questions of law outside of that agency's governing statutes. The Utah Supreme
Court has stated, "When reviewing [an agency] 's interpretation of general

3

Further support that the Board maintained subject matter jurisdiction is found in
the decision from Judge Clint S. Judkins of the First Judicial District Court of
Cache County granting the Board's Motion to Dismiss. On August 20, 2004,
TECS filed a Complaint with the First Judicial District Court of Cache County
seeking a declaratory judgment to determine its legal rights with regards to the
Board. The Board filed a Motion to Dismiss on October 15, 2004, based on
TECS' failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. Judge Judkins granted the
Board's Motion to Dismiss due to TECS' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies on December 1, 2004. TECS failed to appeal this decision. If TECS
truly believed the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, it would have
appealed the District Court's dismissal.
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questions of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, granting no
deference to [agency] decisions." Associated General Contractors v. Board of
Oil Gas and Mining, 2001 UT 112, f 18, 38 P.3d 291, 297, quoting, Williams v.
Public Service Comm 'n., 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988). Thus, agencies can
interpret general questions of law, but the agency decision will be reviewed for
correctness by the appellate court. The Utah Supreme Court further explained that
"'general questions of law' include constitutional questions, rulings concerning an
agency's jurisdiction or authority, interpretations of common law principles, and
interpretations of statutes unrelated to the agency." Id.; see also, Morton v. Int'l,
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991).
Contrary to the Utah Supreme Court, TECS alleges that the Board exceeded
its statutory authority and thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
ultimate issue in this case. See, TECS' Brief at 25, 26. However, the ultimate
issue in this case was whether TECS was required to comply with the statutory
provisions in Title 49 between August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004. In order to rule
on TECS argument that they do not have to comply with Title 49, the Board
reviewed TECS' argument that Title 53A took precedence over Title 49. The
Board found that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) " . . . Petitioner
was required to participate in the URS when it joined effective August 1,2002.
Petitioner remained in URS until it opted out effective June 30, 2004." Addendum
A at 5. Thus, the Board clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to determine
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whether TECS was required to participate with the URS under Title 49 between
August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004.
In sum, the Board maintained subject matter jurisdiction to determine under
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) whether TECS could withdraw from
participation with URS between August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004.

I.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-132 0 2 ( 2 0 0 2 ) REQUIRED TECS TO PARTICIPATE WITH U R S BETWEEN
AUGUST 1,2002 AND JULY 1,2004.

The Board correctly determined that TECS was required to participate with
URS from August 1, 2002, through July 1, 2004, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §4913-202(2002). In its Order, the Board correctly found, "Prior to July 1, 2004,
Petitioner was required to participate in URS if offering retirement benefits to its
employees...." Addendum A at 5; See also, HR at 179.
The language in Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) is clear that as of the
start of the school year in 2002, TECS was a participating employer with URS,
and could not withdraw from "participation in this system."4 Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-202(l)(a)(2002) states, "Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an
4

Even prior to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) without a
specific statute, Utah Courts have determined that an employer could not withdraw
from participation with URS. "From the [Utah Retirement] system's inception, its
design has been such that certainty and stability of membership is necessary to
achieve the actuarial soundness sought by the legislature. This objective could
easily be imperiled if political subdivisions that had joined the system were free to
withdraw at anytime." West Jordan v. Utah State Ret Board, 767 P.2d 530, 532
(Utah 1988). Further, " . . . once a local unit of government had joined the system,
withdrawal was not permitted." Id.
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employer is a participating employer and may not withdraw from participation in
this system." The term "employer" as used in this subsection is defined in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-102(18)(a)(2002) as "any department, educational institution,
or political subdivision of the state eligible to participate in a governmentsponsored retirement system under federal law." Thus, all public education
institutions, including TECS, qualify as an "employer" under this definition
because they are eligible to participate in a public retirement system. It is
undisputed that TECS was an "employer" and thus a participating employer with
URS so long as they are were excluded under Utah Code Ann. §49-13202(2)(2002),
TECS admittedly did not meet the exclusion to participation with URS
under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2)(2002). This subsection states:
(2) An employer not initially admitted or included as a participating
employer in this system prior to January 1, 1982, may be excluded from
participation in this system if:
(a) the employer elects not to provide or participate in any type of private or
public retirement, supplemental or defined contribution plan, either directly
or indirectly for its employees, except for Social Security; or
(b) the employer offers another collectively bargained retirement benefit
and has continued to do so on an uninterrupted basis since that date.
Thus, in 2002, the only exclusions to the participation requirement for an
educational institution like TECS was if the entity elected not to offer or
participate in any retirement plan on behalf or its employees, or the entity offered
a collectively bargained retirement benefit system on a continuous basis since
1982. Here, it is undisputed that TECS did not exist as a legal entity in 1982, and
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no evidence was offered to argue that TECS qualified under the second
subsection.
TECS' own statements offer proof that it also cannot be excluded under the
first exception. On December 4, 2002, and January 16, 2003, TECS' board met
and voted to set up a privately administered retirement plan for its employees.
See, HR at 65. Then, when TECS realized it must participate with URS if it
offered retirement benefits, TECS voluntarily filed an application to join URS on
November 5, 2003, retroactive to August 2002. See, HR at 66-67, 74-76. This
application states in part, " . . . enrollment in the Public Employees'
Noncontributory Retirement System by the applicant organization is permanent
and said organization will remain in the Noncontributory System as required by
law." HR at 42. The Utah Supreme Court determined that this type of statement
in an URS application is further "confirmatory evidence" to the law that once
admitted by URS, a participating employer may not withdraw. West Jordan v.
Utah State Retirement Bd, 767 P.2d 530,532 (Utah 1988).
Despite the statutes and common law, when the legislature contemplated
changing the law in the 2004 legislative session, TECS unilaterally decided it no
longer wanted to continue making retirement contributions on behalf of its
employees to URS. See, TECS' Brief at 20. By then, even by TECS' own
admission, TECS was a participating employer with URS, and pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §49-13-202(l)(2002), " . . . may not withdraw from participation in this
system."
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Tellingly, TECS provides no argument that the retirement statutes are
ambiguous, (TECS called them "straightforward", TECS' Brief at 29), or that they
do not apply to TECS. Instead, TECS begs the question that a conflict exists
between the Title 49 statutes and Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002). The latter
statute states in relevant part, "(1) A charter school shall select its own employees.
(2) The school's governing body shall determine the level of compensation and all
terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided in this part."
TECS' assertion is that this statute conflicts with the Title 49 statutes requiring
participation with URS by public employers if offering any retirement plan to their
employees because otherwise TECS would not be able to determine "all terms and
conditions of employment". TECS' Brief at 29.
TECS' argument that Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2)(2002) prevented
TECS' compliance with Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) is incorrect for two
reasons: 1) Any perceived conflicts between these statutes are easily harmonized;
and 2) the rules of statutory construction favor Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002)
over 53A-la-512(2002) because it was enacted later in time and is more specific.

A.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§49-13-202(2002) AND 53A-lA-512(2002) CAN

AND SHOULD BE HARMONIZED.
First, as TECS correctly noted, the Courts have been clear as to how to
resolve allegations of potentially conflicting statutes:
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Where [the court is] presented with two potentially conflicting statutes, [the
court has] a responsibility to construe them to be in harmony if reasonably
possible. See De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah
1996) (reasoning that" '[w]hen a construction of an act will bring it into
serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in
harmony and avoid conflicts'" (quoting Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d
770, 773 (Utah 1991)).
Division of Unclaimed Property v. McKay Dee Credit Union, 958 P.2d 234
(Utah 1998).
Further, when the court harmonizes statutory provisions "[i]t is axiomatic that a
statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the
legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." State ex. rel. Div. of
Consumer Prot. v. GafCorp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988).
As the Board correctly determined, no conflict exists between these statutes
and they should be interpreted in harmony with one another. The Board found:
A basic rule of statutory construction is that statutes should be interpreted
in harmony with other statutes when possible and reasonable." See,
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). Utah Code Ann. §
49-13-202 does not conflict with Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512. Therefore,
these two statutes can and should be interpreted in harmony.
Addendum A at 4, See also, HR at 178.
The statutory provisions in Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) can easily
be harmonized with those in Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002). An
examination of the two statutes shows that an exception exists to the Utah Code
Ann. §49-13-202(2002) mandatory participation requirements - that is when a
public employer does not offer any retirement benefits to its employees. Utah
Code Ann. §49-13-202(2)(2002). Thus, Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002) can
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be read in conjunction with Title 49 to allow charter schools the ability to choose
whether to offer "any type of private or public retirement, supplemental or defined
contribution plan, either directly or indirectly for its employees . . . " Utah Code
Ann. §49-13-202(2)(a)(2002). If the school chose to offer a retirement plan, it
must offer the systems administered by the Board. However, if it chose not to
offer a retirement plan for its employees, it need not participate with URS. Thus,
TECS maintains full discretion under Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002) to
determine the level of compensation and all the terms and conditions of
employment. However, once a decision has been made to offer retirement benefits
to employees, TECS must offer those benefits through URS.
Furthermore, nothing in the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §53A-la512(2002) grants charter schools the discretion to ignore the provisions of Title 49
in choosing retirement benefits for its employees. Instead, the legislature
undoubtedly meant that charter schools could determine the terms of employment
within the parameters of the existing law. For example, no one reasonably
suggests that a charter school could contract for employment to perform an illegal
act. See, Castleglen, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 984 F.2d 1571, 1582 (10th Or.
1993) (quoting Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38, 41, 206 P.553, 555 (1922)("Every
contract in violation of law is void."). Yet, TECS implies that the discretion
granted by the legislature to charter schools is broad enough to ignore the
remainder of applicable laws relating to the "terms and conditions of
employment." TECS' Brief at 29. This is the type of unreasonable result the court
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had in mind in stating, "[i]t is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable
and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or
unreasonable result." State ex. rel Div. of Consumer Prot v. GafCorp., 760 P.2d
310,313 (Utah 1988).
As additional support for harmonizing the statutes, most, if not all, public
employers maintain the statutory discretion to determine the conditions of
employment for their employees. For example, Utah's counties are given the
specific authority by the legislature for "(1) recruiting, selecting, and advancing
employees on the basis of their relative ability, knowledge, and skills, including
open consideration of qualified applicants for initial appointment; [and to create a]
(2) provision of equitable and adequate compensation . . . " for those employees.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-3(1) and (2).5 These types of public employer statutes

5

Other examples of broad authority granted by the legislature to determine the
conditions of public employment to public employers include: traditional public
school boards ".. . may enter into written employment contracts] for a term not to
exceed five years." Utah Code Ann. §53A-3-411; and Newly created school
districts "shall: (i) have discretion in the hiring of all other staff; (ii) adopt the
personnel policies and practices of the existing district, including salary schedules
and benefits; and (iii) enter into agreements with employees of the new district, or
their representatives, that have the same terms as those in the negotiated
agreements between the existing district and its employees." Utah Code Ann.
§53A-2-122(l)(b).
Similarly, the Department of Human Resource Management for the State of
Utah maintains the authority to "develop, implement, and administer a statewide
program of human resource management... design and administer the state pay
plan, and design and administer the state classification system and procedures for
determining schedule assignments;..." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-6(l)(a), (b) and
(c).
Municipalities may also select the compensation for their employees. Utah
Code Ann. §10-3-818(1) states, "The elective and statutory officers of
24

are also in harmony with Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) requiring mandatory
participation with URS if offering any retirement benefits. However, if TECS
somehow is allowed to withdraw from URS, nothing would prevent any other
public employer from making the same argument TECS has made under their
similar statutes which could impact the actuarial soundness of URS. Thus, "terms
and conditions of employment'' cannot mean ignoring all other statutes that may
apply to employment of charter school employees.
Finally, as a policy matter, if TECS truly believed that Utah Code Ann.
§53A-la-512(2002) allowed it the choice to ignore the employer participation
provisions in Title 49, it certainly begs the question as to why TECS joined URS
in 2003 at all. See, Addendum A at 3, See also, HR at 177. It certainly appears
that even TECS believed it had to join URS prior to July 1, 2004, and only when it
appeared there may be a legislative change did it manufacture its argument
concerning a conflict in the statutes. Like TECS apparently believed in 2003, the
statutes are clear that if TECS wanted to offer retirement benefits to their
employees, it must participate with URS.

municipalities shall receive such compensation for their services as the governing
body may fix by ordinance adopting compensation or compensation schedules
enacted after public hearing."
25

B.

UNDER THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, UTAH CODE
ANN, §49-11-202(2002) TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 5 3 A - 1 A - 5 1 2 BECAUSE IT WAS ENACTED LATER IN TIME AND
IS MORE SPECIFIC,

In the alternative, even if the statutes are found to be irreconcilable, Utah
Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) should take precedence over Utah Code Ann. §53Ala-512(2002) under the rules of statutory construction. The Board reiterates that it
believes the statutes can be harmonized without resorting to this statutory
construction analysis. Nevertheless, even if the Court proceeds with this analysis,
the Board prevails. As TECS noted, in order to determine legislative intent as to
which of two conflicting statutes should control, the Court has expressed two
guiding principles: a) statutes enacted later in time are given preference over those
enacted previously, and b) a statute more specific in application more closely
approximates legislative intent than a more general statute. Here, Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-202(2002) was both enacted later and is more specific than Utah Code
Ann. §53A-la-512(2002), and thus any conflicts should be resolved in favor of
Utah Code Ann.§49-13-202(2002).
The Court has stated that "when there is an irreconcilable conflict between
the new provision and the prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, the
new provision is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of the legislature."
Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 757 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). See
also, Board of Education of Jordan School Dist v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37,
Tf20, 94 P.3d 234, 239 (2004) ("When two statutes relating to the same subject
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matter unavoidably conflict, the later statute may be viewed as having impliedly
repealed inconsistent provisions of the earlier statute.").
As TECS admits, Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 was enacted in 1998. See,
TECS' Brief, at 31; L.1998, ch. 231, §16. Also undisputed is the fact that some of
the principles found in Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) were enacted by the
legislature prior to 1998. See, Utah Code Ann. §49-3-204(2001). However, in
2002 the legislature re-codified the entirety of Title 49 in SHB 250. A copy of the
relevant portion of this bill which revised all of Title 49 including Utah Code Ann.
§49-3-204(2001), the corresponding statute to what is now Utah Code Ann. §4913-202, is attached as Addendum B.6 This re-codification was far more than a
mere "renumbering" of the previous statutes. It made multiple changes to Title
49, including changes to previously enacted Utah Code Ann. §49-3-204(2001).
For example, this bill added new subsections three, four and five and deleted
subsections five through seven in their entirety. See, Addendum B.
After the legislature passed SHB 250 in 2002, and prior to the 2004
legislative session, SHB 250 was the latest expression of the legislature's intent
regarding participation of public employers with URS. Because Utah Code Ann.
§49-13-202(2002) was enacted four years following Utah Code Ann. §53A-la512, the Title 49 provision is deemed controlling.

6

The entire enrolled bill can be found at
www.le.state.ut.us/-2002/bills/hbillenr/hb0250.htm.
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In addition, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002) is controlling because it is
more specific in application than Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002). The Utah
Supreme Court has held, "[W]hen two statutory provisions conflict in their
operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more
general provision." Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, ^[9, 84
P.3d 1201, 1205; See also, Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co. 2003 UT 8, ^31, 70
P.3d 1, 8 (2003) ("When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more
specific provision will govern over the more general provision.")
Here, the Title 49 provision is more specific than the Title 53 A provision
because the Title 49 provision applies to determine whether a public employer
should participate with URS for their employee retirement benefits, whereas the
Title 53 A provision only generally allows charter schools to determine the
compensation and terms of employment for their employees. TECS mistakenly
assumes that because Title 53 A only applies to charter schools that this makes it
more specific because Title 49 applies to all public employers. TECS' Brief, at
32. However, it is not the number of individuals to which a statutory provision
applies which makes it specific or general. It is, as the Supreme Court stated,
which statute is "more specific in operation . . . . " Id. Because Title 49 is specific
as to when public employers must participate with URS in providing specific
retirement benefits while Title 53 A only provides a general provision allowing
charter schools to determine employee benefits, Title 49 is more specific in its
operation and holds precedence over Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002).

28

In sum, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-13-202(2002), TECS was required
to participate with URS between August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004. Yet, even if
the court determines the statutes are in conflict, Utah Code Ann. §49-13202(2002) was enacted later and is more specific than Utah Code Ann. §53A-la512(2002), and thus Utah Code Ann.§49-13-202(2002) maintains precedence over
Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512(2002).

II.

T H E HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT HB 108(2004)
DID NOT MERELY CLARIFY THE LAW, BUT CHANGED THE LAW IN MAKING
PARTICIPATION BY CHARTER SCHOOLS WITH URS VOLUNTARY RATHER
THAN MANDATORY.

After TECS determined to join URS in late 2003, and after TECS had
started paying retirement contributions to URS, it unilaterally determined to cease
paying retirement contributions for its employees to URS in early 2004. TECS
claims it did so because it learned of legislative efforts to "clarify" the existing
law. See, TECS' Brief at 20. In the 2004 general session, the legislature passed
HB 108 making it voluntary for charter schools to participate with URS instead of
mandatory. HB 108(2004). These new provisions also granted current charter
schools a one-time irrevocable election beginning July 1, 2004, and ending
December 31, 2004, to choose whether to participate with URS. Because these
new provisions amended rather than clarified the existing law, the Board was
correct in determining:
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Prior to July 1, 2004, TECS was required to participate in URS if offering
retirement benefits to its employees. HB 108(2004), effective July 1, 2004,
did not simply clarify existing law, but amended the law by making
participation in the URS by charter schools voluntary instead of
mandatory.
Addendum A at 5, See also, HR at 179.
Despite the fact that this new act clearly amended the law, TECS argues
that HB 108(2004) only "clarified" the existing law and implies that it should be
applied retroactively to TECS. However, HB 108 (2004) cannot be considered a
clarification of existing law because it was not procedural or remedial. In
enlarging charter school rights and changing URS' duties with regards to
participation of charter schools, it made substantive changes to the law. As such,
HB 108 (2004) was more than a mere a clarification of the existing law.
Regarding the retroactive application of a law, the Utah Supreme Court
declared:
A statute is not to be applied retroactively unless the statute expressly
declares that it operates retroactively. . .. This rule applies only with
respect to substantive laws, however; statutes that do not "enlarge,
eliminate, or destroy" substantive rights can be applied retroactively.
Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we consider in
deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or procedural purpose.
When analyzing whether applying a statute as amended "would have
retroactive effects inconsistent with the usual rule that legislation is deemed
to be prospective," we should use "a common sense, functional judgment
about 'whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment.' This judgment should be informed
and guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance,
and settled expectations.'" Considering the strong presumptions against
retroactivity in the law, and the common sense, functional factors that we
consider in deciding whether to apply a law retroactively, we should err on
the side of finding a statute substantive if we have doubt about the issue.
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Goebel v. Salt Lake City So. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ^[39, 104 P.3d 1185,
1197-98, quoting, Moore v. Am. Coal Co., Ill P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987);
Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357-58, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347
(1999). (internal citations omitted).
Thus, unless the amendment can be shown to be remedial or procedural
using a "common sense" or functional approach, this Court should presume a
change in the law will only apply prospectively. Here, common sense dictates that
HB 108(2004) was neither remedial nor procedural and contained no express
declaration that it should be applied retroactively.
HB 108 (2004) amended Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-512 to include the
following new provisions:
(5) Except as provided under Subsection (6), an employee of
a charter school shall be a member of a retirement system
under Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Act.
(6)(a) At the time of application for a charter school, whether
sponsored by the state or a school district, a proposed charter
school may make an election of nonparticipation as an
employer for retirement programs under Title 49, Chapter 13,
Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement Act.
(b) A charter school that was approved prior to July 1, 2004
may make an election of nonparticipation prior to December
31,2004.
(c) An election under this Subsection (6);
(i) is a one-time election made at the time specified under
Subsection (6)(a) or (b);
(ii) shall be documented by a resolution adopted by the
governing body of the charter school;
(iii) is irrevocable; and
(iv) applies to the charter school as the employer and to all
employees of the charter school.
(d) The governing body of a charter school may offer
employee benefit plans for its employees:
(i) under Title 49, Chapter 20, Public Employees9
Benefits and Insurance Program Act; or
(ii) under any other program.
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HB 108(2004) also amended U.C.A. §49-13-202 to add: "(3) An employer
that is a charter school sponsored by the State Board of Education or a local school
district that makes an election of nonparticipation in accordance with Section 53 Ala-512 may be excluded as a participating employer."
Instead of retroactive application, this bill set up a prospective procedure
for both existing and new charter schools to voluntarily choose to participate with
URS. By opening a window of time in which current charter schools participating
with URS could elect not to participate with URS, the legislature's understanding
is clear that an election of nonparticipation was forbidden by the law prior to this
statute taking effect. As stated supra, even TECS acquiesced to the law in 2002
and 2003 that if a charter school offered any retirement benefits to its employees,
it must offer URS benefits under Title 49 by applying for admission to URS and
paying retirement contributions.
Further, HB 108(2004) cannot be applied retroactively because it is not
remedial. In fact, TECS failed to argue any ambiguity in either section 53A-la512(2002) or 49-13-202(2002), calling them "equally straightforward." TECS'
Brief, at 29. Thus, by TECS' own admission, these amendments are not remedial.
In addition, HB 108 (2004) made substantive and not procedural
amendments to the law because the bill allowed charter schools only a small
window in which to make an election of nonparticipation with URS and that this
election is irrevocable. A charter school maintained no substantive right to elect to
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withdraw from participation with URS prior to this statute's enactment in 2004.
Although this statute sets up a "procedure" for charter schools electing not to
participate with URS, the statute affects substantive rights and duties of both
charter schools and URS. Thus, it cannot be applied retroactively to TECS.
Hence, because HB 108 (2004) did not expressly state it applied
retroactively, and because it set up prospective substantive changes to the law, it
cannot be applied retroactively as a "clarification" of the prior law. As such, it
does not provide an excuse for TECS' failure to participate with URS between
August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004.

IV,

THOUGH THE BOARD WILL NOT BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED, TECS FAILED
TO RAISE THE ARGUMENT OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT BEFORE THE AHO,
THEREBY PRECLUDING IT FROM RAISING IT FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.

TECS admits in its brief that it did not raise the issue of unjust enrichment
before the AHO. See, TECS' Brief at 39 n. 100. This Court has held, "'[w]e will
review issues raised for the first time on appeal only if exceptional circumstances
or "plain error" exists.'" Montierth v. Utah State Retirement Board, 2006 UT App
389 {quoting "Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ^[39, 86 P.3d 699. "in addition,
'issues not raised in proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to
judicial review except in exceptional circumstances." Id. {quoting Brown & Root
Indus. Serv. v. Insutrial Comm 'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). TECS
does not argue in its brief that either plain error or exceptional circumstances exist
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in order to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. As such, its attempt to
argue that the Board is unjustly enriched should be ignored by this Court.
Even if TECS were allowed to raise this argument for the first time on
appeal, the Board will not be unjustly enriched. TECS alleges for the first time on
appeal that it has "undertaken considerable efforts to 'make whole' its employees"
and if required to pay the contributions to the Board, the Board would be unjustly
enriched. See, TECS Brief at 38-39. Contributions made to the Board are based
on actuarial assumptions and vest to the employee's benefit, not the Board's
benefit. Hence, the Board does not "get rich" as a legal entity.
Furthermore, TECS' argument that its employees have been "made whole"
remains an issue solely between TECS and it's employees. No statutory rule
prohibits TECS from contributing more in retirement benefits to its employees
than URS grants. The statutes merely set a minimum, and TECS can offer another
retirement benefit in addition if it so desires.
Finally, as an administrator of a public retirement plan, the Board takes
seriously its fiduciary obligations to act in the sole interest and benefit of its
members. The eligible employees of TECS properly earned service credit in the
Public Employees Noncontributory Retirement System after TECS decided to join
URS. As such, these employees are owed retirement service credit for their
employment. Such service credit would allow employees to move from school to
school or district to district within the state without losing any retirement benefits.
However, without payment for these contributions, the Board cannot grant service
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credit to these employees without incurring the wrath of other public employers
who have properly paid into retirement system. By law, URS must protect these
employee's benefits.
Without the requirement that delinquent public employers be required to
pay retirement contributions, any public employer could simply decide not to pay
benefits for their employees without penalty. Such a scenario would violate both
fiduciary law and public policy. As such, the Board maintains a legal and ethical
obligation to TECS' eligible employees during this time period to obtain these
retirement contributions and interest from TECS.

CONCLUSION
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject TECS' appeal in its entirety.
The Board clearly acted within its jurisdictional power and statutory authority in
determining that TECS was required to participate in the URS prior to July 1,
2004. In its Order, the Board correctly determined that Utah Code Ann. §§49-13202(2002) and 53A-1A-512(2002) were not in conflict, and TECS was required to
participate with URS between August 1, 2002 and July 1, 2004. Furthermore, the
AHO correctly determined that HB 108(2004) did not merely clarify the law, but
changed the law by making participation by charter schools with URS voluntary
rather than mandatory. Finally, the Board asks this Court to ignore TECS
allegations of unjust enrichment due to TECS failure to raise this claim before the
AHO.
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DATED this

(

day of May, 2007.

jL^b)
B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee/Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to Marty E. Moore of
BEARNSON & PECK, LC, 74 West 100 North, Logan, Utah 84321, on this the
~V

day of May, 2007.
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

THOMAS EDISON CHARTER SCHOOL,
Petitioner,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACTS,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,

File #: 04-18R

:

Hearing Officer: Howe
Respondent.

A hearing was held on October 3, 2006, before Richard C. Howe, Adjudicative Hearing
Officer, on Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Petitioner was represented by Marty E. Moore
of the law firm of Bearnson and Peck, LLC. The Utah State Retirement Board ("USRB") was
represented by David B. Hansen of the law firm of Howard, Phillips & Andersen. Based upon the
evidence in this matter and the legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer
rendered a decision in favor of the USRB. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Utah State Retirement Board ("USRB") is a statutorily created entity under Utah
Code Ann. § 49-11-202, which administers the Utah Retirement System's ("URS")
plans and programs for all public employers which are eligible under Title 49.
1
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2.

Thomas Edison Charter School ("TECS") is a state-sponsored charter school that
receives public funds and is engaged in educational activities.

3.

Before receiving its charter and opening the school to students in the fall of 2002, the
TECS Governing Board considered offering retirement benefits to TECS employees
at a meeting held on March 6, 2002.

4.

The TECS Governing Board voted at a meeting on December 4, 2002, and January
16, 2003, to set up a 40IK retirement plan for its employees.

5.

TECS was advised by representatives of the Utah State Office of Education (the
"USOE"), which was TECS's statutory sponsor at the time - that charter schools
offering retirement benefits to their employees were legally required to participate in
the URS.

6.

The USOE position regarding mandatory participation in the URS was circulated to
charter schools in a June 24, 2003, e-mail from Patty Murphy, Education Specialist in
Finance and Auditing at the USOE, stating:
The question of whether a charter needs to participate in the State's
retirement system has been raised by a new charter school. For purposes
of clarification, as a state educational entity, if any retirement is offered to
employees, participation in the State's system is mandatory. Therefore, if
no retirement plan is offered, participation is not mandatory. The penalty
of recovery is expensive. For example, if a charter school has offered a
403b fro three years, the school must contribute all funds (including
interest) that would have accrued during that time to the State's system.
Please see Utah Code 49-13-201 to 203. For further information, please
contact Cindy Bon at State Retirement Office, 801-366-7736.
The statement in Ms. Murphy's e-mail set forth in the paragraph above
regarding mandatory participation in the URS accurately reflected the URS's
position on this subject through 2003 and at all times prior thereto and since.

2
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7.

In the summer of 2003, the TECS Governing Board met in Cache County with Cory
Wood, the URS field services representative in Cache County - who stated that TECS
was legally required to join URS if the TECS Governing Board offered any
retirement benefits to TECS employees.

8.

At its meeting on September 9, 2003, the TECS Governing Board voted to join URS,,
giving as its reason in its minutes the USOE decree that TECS "cannot opt out of the
URS." TECS joined URS rather than establish a privately administered pension plan
because of direction from the URS and the Utah State Office of Education which was
then TECS's charter sponsor.

9.

On November 5, 2003, TECS voluntarily filed an Employer Application for the
Public Employees' Noncontributoiy Retirement System with an effective date of
August 2002. TECS included with its application a letter of intention dated
November 5, 2003, signed by the TECS Board Chairman, asking for retroactive
benefits for its employees back to the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year.

10.

On December 11, 2003, TECS was approved by the URSB for membership in the
URS.

11.

Normal contribution reporting for TECS employees began in January 2004 and
continued into the first part of March 2004. Total retirement contributions received
by URS during this period were $11,733.97.

12.

TECS has made no contributions to the URS since it paid $11,797.37 in the first part
of2004.

13.

In its 2004 general session, the Utah Legislature enacted H.B. 108, which was signed
into law by Gov. Walker on March 23, 2004.

3
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14.

In September 2004, the TECS Governing Board voted to opt out of the URS under
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-13-202 and 53A-la-512 as amended by H.B.
108 in the 2004 general legislative session. TECS's Declaration of Participation or
Intent for a Charter School stating that TECS had made "an irrevocable election of
nonparticipation as an employer for retirement programs with Utah Retirement
Systems under Title 49" effective July 1, 2004, was submitted to the URS in
December 2004.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) provides: "The moving party in any proceeding
brought under this section shall bear the burden of proof." Therefore, Petitioner bears
the burden of proof in this matter.

2.

A basic rule of statutory construction is that statutes should be interpreted in harmony
with other statutes when possible and reasonable. See, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d
1314, 1318 Utah 1983). Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202 does not conflict with Utah Code
Ann. § 53A-la-512. Therefore, these two statutes can and should be interpreted in
harmony.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-512(l) and (2) (2002) provides: "(1) A charter school shall
select its own employees. (2) The school's governing body shall determine the level of
compensation and all terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise provided
in this part."

4

000

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-202(1) and (2) (2002) l states:
(l)(a) Unless excluded under Subsection (2), an employer is a participating employer
and may not withdraw from participation in this system.
(b) In addition to their participation in this system, participating employers may
provide or participate in any additional public or private retirement, supplemental or
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for their employees.
(2) An employer not initially admitted or included as a participating employer in this
system prior to January 1, 1982, may be excluded from participation in this system if the
employer elects not to provide or participate in any type of private or public retirement,
supplemental or defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for its
employees, except for Social Security.
Accordingly, if an eligible employer offers any type of retirement or defined
contribution plan, they must participate in the Utah Retirement Systems.

5.

Prior to July 1, 2004, Petitioner was required to participate in URS if offering retirement
benefits to its employees. HB 108 (2004), effective July 1, 2004, did not simply clarify
existing law, but amended the law by making participation in the URS by charter schools
voluntary instead of mandatory.

6.

Thus, Petitioner was required to participate in the URS when it joined effective August 1,
2002. Petitioner remained in URS until it opted out effective June 30,2004.

7.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 49-11-601, Petitioner owes to URS delinquent contributions
accruing between August 1, 2002, and June 30, 2004, in the amount of $100,722.50
(including interest) to date. Such interest will continue to accrue in accordance with Title
49 provisions until paid. TECS also owes URS $22,456.29 in penalties in accordance
with U.C. A. § 49-11-601 for failure to pay timely contributions.

1

In his Ruling on this matter, the Hearing Officer referred to U.C. A. § 49-12-202(1) and (2), which is the Public
Employees' Contributory System. However, since TECS would have been enrolled in the Public Employees'
Noncontributory System, which is U.C.A. § 49-13-101, et seq., it is more appropriate to refer to chapter 13. It
should be noted, however, that U.C.A. § 49-12-202(1) and (2) and U.C.A. § 49-13-202(1) and (2) were and are
identical in relevant part.
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8.

Petitioner did not join URS under a mistake of law or a misrepresentation of the
requirements of the law. As such, no grounds for rescission of its agreement with URS
exist.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's requests are hereby denied. Petitioner is

hereby ordered to pay URS $100,722.50 in delinquent contributions, including interest. Interest
will continue to accrue in accordance with Title 49 provisions until paid. Petitioner is also
required to pay URS $22,456.29 in penalties in accordance with U.C.A. § 49-11-601 for failure
to pay timely contributions.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, it may seek a judicial review within
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of
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Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16.

DATED this 3$

day of November, 2006.

's£*~LC?-fl*~^Richard C. Howe
Adjudicative Hearing Officer
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The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.

Dated this J^fcy

of

fra-p^A^y.

, 2006.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

JohM^fht, Board President

8

000182

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this the _jjg^day of *K>CC6Yrfaer0'
2006,1 mailed a true
and correct copy of the above Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order, postage
pre-paid, to the following:

Marty E. Moore
Bearnson & Peck, L.C.
74 West 100 North
Logan, UT 84321
David B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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ADDENDUM B

SHB 250(2002)
[49^3-204], 49-13-202. Participation of employers — Limitations — Exclusions —
Admission requirements — Nondiscrimination requirements.
(1) (sl [All political subdivisions of the state, unless] Unless excluded under Subsection (2),
[are] an employer is a participating [employers in the system] employer and may not withdraw from
participation in [the] this system. [All departments and educational institutions arc also
participating
employers in the system and may not withdraw from participation in the system. As participating
employers, political subdivisions, departments, and educational institutions shall meet all
requirements for full participation in the system.]
(b) In addition to their participation in this system, participating employers mayproyide or
participate in any additional public or private retirement supplemental or defined contribution
plan.
either directly or indirectly, for their employees.
(2) [Any political subdivision] An employer not initially admitted or included as a
participating employer in [the] this system prior to January 1, 1982, may be excluded from
participation in [the] this system if the [political subdivision] employer elects not to provide or
participate in any type of private or public retirement, supplemental or [deferred income program]
defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, for its employees, except for Social Security.
1. -112 -

[Any excluded political subdivision]
(3) If an employer elects at any time toproyide or participate in any type of public orpriyate
retirement, supplemental or defined contribution plan, either directly or indirectly, except for
social
security, the employer shall be a participating employer in this system.
(4) (a) Any employer may by resolution of its governing body apply for [and receive]
admission to [the] this system. [Once admitted, the political subdivision may not withdraw from
participation and shall meet all requirements for full participation in the system. If an excluded
political subdivision elects at any time to provide or participate in any type of public or private
retirement, supplemental or deferred income program, either directly or indirectly, except for
social
security, the political subdivision shall be required to be a participating employer in the system.
As
a participating employer, the political subdivision may not withdraw from participation and shall
meet all requirements for full participation in the system.]
[(3) (a) Any organization or agency supported in whole or in part by state public funds,
which prior to application is not covered by this chapter, may by resolution of its governing body
apply for admission to the system. The board may refuse admission to any organization or agency
applying for admission upon a finding that it is not in the best interest of the participating
employers

and employees.]
(b) Upon approval of the board, the [organization or agency shall become a participant in
the system if the board and the organization or agency agree upon:] employer is a participating
employer in this system and is subject to this title.
[(i) the terms by which its employees shall become members of the system, such as the
effective date of coverage;]
[(ii) the amount of prior service credit with which they may be credited, if any;]
[(iii) the amount of any contributions in addition to regular contributions that will be
required to provide any prior service credits or retroactive current service credits from cither the
employing unit or its employees; mid]
[(iv) the manner in which retroactive current or prior service credits may be established, if
any:]
~ 113 -

[(c) Once admitted to the system, an organization or agency may not withdraw from
participation, except as provided in Subsection (4), and shall meet all requirements for full
participation in the system.]
[(d) An organization or agency supported in whole or in part by public funds may not apply
for or receive admission to the system after July 1, 1991.]
[(4) (a) An organization or agency admitted to the system pursuant to Subsection (3) which
no longer receives public funds may withdrawfromthe system if:]
[(i) the organization or agcncy?s governing body by resolution petitions the board for
withdrawal from the system; and]
[(ii) the board approves the withdrawal.]
[(b) Once approval to withdraw is granted, the organization or agency and its employees
shall be governed by Sections 49-1-502 and 49-1-503 .]
[(5) Except as provided in Sections 49-3-206 and 49-3-207 , no participating employer may
maintain full participation in the system by covering only part of its employees. The full
participation requirement is satisfied if a participating employer covers tliosc of its employees
eligible for coverage under:]
[(a) Title 49, Chapter 4, Public Safety Retirement Act; or]
[(b) Title 49, Chapter 5, FircfightersT Retirement Act and its remaining employees under
cither Title 49, Chapter 2, Public Employees* Retirement Act or Title 49, Chapter 3, Public
Employees1 Noncontributory Retirement Act, whichever is applicable.]
[(6) In addition to their participation in the system, participating employers may provide or
participate in any additional public or private retirement, supplemental or deferred income
program,
cither directly or indirectly, for their employees.]
[(7) (a) Credit unions or private hospitals which arc participating units in any system
administered by the board may withdraw from participation upon applying to the board. This
application shall be made between July 1,2000, and December 31,2000. The withdrawal is
effective the day after the last day the withdrawing unit pays retirement contributions on its

employees1 salaries.]
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[(b) Once the withdrawal of the credit union or private hospital is complete, the employees
of the withdrawing unit may apply to withdraw thcii vested contributions. Refunds shall then be
paid
in accordance with Subsection 49-1-502 (3).]
[(c) Under no circumstance may a withdrawing unit receive the employer contributions
which have been made to the system.]
(5) If a participating employer purchases service credit on behalf of regular full-time
employees for service rendered prior to the participating employer's admission to this system.
the
service credit shall be purchased in a nondiscriminatory manner on behalf of all current and
former
regular full-time employees who were eligible for service credit at the time service was rendered.
Section 74. Section 49-13-203 , which is renumbered from Section 49-3-206 is renumbered
and amended to read:
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H.B. 250 Substitute Retirement Law Recodification (Bigelow, R.)
Date
m4/2002
1/14/2002
1/15/2002
1/21/2002
1/21/2002
1/21/2002
1/21/2002
1/24/2002
1/31/2002
1/31/2002
1/31/2002
1/31/2002
1/31/2002
1/31/2002
1/31/2002
2/4/2002
2/4/2002
2/5/2002
2/26/2002
2/26/2002
2/27/2002
2/27/2002
2/27/2002
2/27/2002
2/27/2002
2/28/2002
3/1/2002
3/19/2002
3/20/2002
3/26/2002

Action
Numbered
Bill Distributed
House Received from General Counsel
House Read 1st Time (Introduced)
House Under Suspension of the Rules
House Read 2nd Time
House Received Fiscal Note from Fiscal
House Read 3rd Time
House Substituted
House Amended
House Passed 3rd Reading
House Sent to Senate
Bill Distributed
Senate/received from House
Senate/read 1st (Introduced)
Senate/to Standing Committee
Senate Comm - Favorable Recommendation
Senate/committee report favorable
Senate/read 2nd
Senate/pass 2nd
Senate/read 3rd
Senate/pass 3rd
Senate/signed by President to House
House Received from Senate
House Signed by Speaker/Enrolled
Received from House for Enrolling
Enroll Draft
Pass Review Forward for Enrolling
House Sent to Governor
Governor Signed

http://www.le.state.ut.us/~2002/status/hbillsta/hb0250sl.htm

Location
LBGC
LRGC
HJNT.RQ
HSIRUL
HSTRUL
H3RDHB
H3RDHB
H3RDHB
HSUB
HSUB
SSEC
SSEC
SSEC
SINTRO
SSTRJJL
SSTQGE
SSTQGE
S2ND
S2ND
S3RD
S3RD
SPRES
HSPKR
HSPKR
LRGCEN
LRGCEN
LRGCEN
HCLERK
EGOV
ELTGOV

Vote

67 0 8

302

23 0 6
24 0 5
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